The summaries on this website are summaries of the opinions issued by the judges of the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia from October 2004 to date. The opinions may be searched by year, judge, category and chapter. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword in the search box above. This opinion bank, however, is not an exhaustive list of opinions issued by the judges of the Western District. These summaries are not intended to replace other research methods, but may be used as a starting point for your research. These summaries do not contain information as to whether an opinion has been published, appealed or the disposition of any such appeal, or otherwise overruled or affected by subsequent case law or statute. These summaries have been prepared for the convenience of the researcher and in no way constitute an interpretation by the Court of the opinion summarized. Please rely on the opinion not the summary. Please contact Judge Connelly's chambers or Judge Black's chambers regarding any questions or errors.
Creditor objected to the debtors' claims of exemption based on the debtors' failure to include certain property in their bankruptcy schedules. Court held that a debtor's failure to schedule property does not give rise to an objection to a claim of exemption. Further, a determination by the Chapter 7 Trustee that the case was a no asset case rendered moot any objections to the claims of exemptions.
The chapter 13 trustee filed a motion to dismiss the debtor’s case or to convert it to a chapter 7 case on the ground that the amount of the debtor’s unsecured, liquidated and noncontingent debt on the date the case was filed makes her ineligible to proceed under chapter 13. Reviewing the debtor’s original schedules and the debtor’s amended schedules, the Court found the unsecured debt to exceed the statutory limits of 11 U.S.C. § 109(e). The Court thus granted the trustee’s motion to dismiss but stayed the ruling for fourteen days to permit the debtor to convert.
The debtors requested a temporary waiver of the requirements to obtain credit counseling based on exigent circumstances as the male debtor was seriously ill and the female debtor was required to render constant care to her husband. Because the debtors failed to establish either that they obtained approved credit counseling education before filing their petition or made a request to an approved agency for such a course which was not available to them within seven days of making such request, as is explicitly required by § 109(h), they were not eligible to be debtors in the case. The court further concluded that the provisions of § 109(h)(4) did not permit the court to waive the requirement.
The debtor filed a motion to seek a discharge of her student loan debt under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). The government in response filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that the debtor cannot establish the elements necessary to entitle her to a discharge under section 523(a)(8). The court found that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to each element of the Brunner Test for a hardship discharge, which thus compelled the case to trial. Accordingly, the court denied the motion for summary judgment.
In deciding whether to grant motions to avoid liens against residential property, the court considered whether a debtor must file a homestead deed under applicable Virginia law to perfect a claim in exempt equity in the property in order to obtain the relief sought of avoidance of the judgment liens which have attached to that equity. Applying the then-recently decided Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals case of Botkin v. DuPont Community Credit Union, 650 F.3d 396 (4th Cir. 2011), the court concluded that no such homestead deed need be filed.
The United States Trustee filed a complaint to revoke the male debtor’s discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(1), alleging that he obtained the discharge through fraud and fraudulently failed to disclose certain transfers to the trustee. The court concluded that the debtor’s discharge should be revoked pursuant to its authority under 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(1).
The United States Trustee objected to the commission sought by the chapter 7 trustee, arguing that the trustee’s inaction regarding a shareholder derivative suit and failure to respond to inquiries from the United States Trustee fell well below the acceptable standard. The court sustained the objection and allowed the trustee, subject to his proper completion of his duties in the case, a reduced commission plus reimbursement of expenses.
The Debtor filed a motion seeking an extension of the automatic stay and requesting the Court enjoin the City of Lynchburg and a utility company from collecting any further deposit or disrupting the Debtor’s utility service. The Court dismissed the motion as moot because the Debtor had duplicated the relief requested from previous motions, which were set for separate hearing.
In a Chapter 7 case, the Debtor filed a motion seeking to “set a fair and reasonable deposit for water in the City of Lynchburg,” to enjoin “any further collection for any and all past due amounts,” and to enjoin “any disconnection of services.” At the hearing on the motion, the Court determined that the City made no effort to collect any pre-petition debt, that the Debtor owed the City less than $10.00 for post-petition water services, that the City had no intention of collecting a deposit from the Debtor unless the Debtor became significantly delinquent in the future.
The Court denied the motion, holding that, because the City did not intend to collect a deposit at the time, there was no need to set a deposit amount. Further, because the automatic stay of § 362(a) remained in effect, and because the discharge injunction under § 524(c)(2) was to take effect upon expiration of the automatic stay, there was no need to issue an order enjoining the City from attempting to collect any dischargeable debt arising pre-petition. The court also determined that it did not have jurisdiction over the post-petition disconnection policies or decisions of the City.
The Debtor filed a pro se motion, which the Court interpreted as seeking an order directing the refund of the Debtor’s pre-petition deposit paid to a utility company to be used as a post-petition deposit to avoid disruption of service. The utility company had offset the refund from the amount owed to the company pre-petition. The Court denied the motion with respect to compelling the company to transfer the deposit, finding that the Debtor provided no legal basis for such a request. However, the Court scheduled a hearing regarding the request to enjoin the company from requiring a post-petition deposit or disconnecting service and ordered that the company was enjoined from requiring any deposit or disconnecting the Debtor’s electrical service until the hearing and further order of the Court.